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Purpose: The purpose of  this paper investigates the subject behavior of  Energy conservation
and emission reduction (ECER) based on structured classification of  the organization types of
FLF supply chain, and explores reasonable behavior incentive mechanism for ECER of  FLF
supply chain in China.
Design/methodology/approach: This  paper  classifies  the  organization  subjects  of  FLF
supply  chain,  and  different  characteristics  of  organization  subjects  are  compared  in  detail.
ECER behavior incentive  mechanism modeling of  FLF supply  chain is  explored by taking
advantage of  principal-agent model in view of  asymmetry information.  Incentives issue of
different operating subjects is discussed as enlightenment of  the model.
Findings: Three types of  the organization subjects of  FLF supply chain in China have been
identified  as:  loose  organization,  semi-compact  organization  and  compact  organization.
Subjects of  different types have different abilities to conduct ECER work. Government needs
to propose differentiation polices of  incentive compensation for different operating subjects,
widen the gap of  differentiated subsidies/rewards for different investment levels on ECER
conducted by different operating subjects of  FLF supply chain.
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Research limitations/implications: It will take long-term unremitting efforts to achieve the
target  of  ECER work  for  FLF supply  chain  in  China,  the  dynamic  issues  and simulation
modeling on behavior incentive mechanism of  ECER should be developed in future research.
Practical implications: Clear understanding of  structured classification of  the organization
subject types of  FLF supply chain and the behavior incentive mechanism for ECER, will help
government to improve the ECER work in an efficient and effective way. 
Originality/value: Research  to  behavior  incentive  mechanism  of  ECER  has  important
theoretical value and practical significance. This paper contributes to distinguish three types of
operating subjects  of  FLF  supply  chain  in  China,  put  forward  the  behavior  incentive
mechanism of  ECER to support the government to improve the ECER work scientifically.
Keywords: behavioral incentive, energy conservation, emission reduction, freshwater live fish, supply
chain organization
1. Introduction
Modern supply chain of freshwater live fish (FLF) refers to link the various functional links of
FLF from  production  areas  to  consumption  areas  into  an  organic  whole which  includes
production,  fishing, commercialization, transport, handling, culturing, distribution, transaction
and settlement, quality information and so on, carry out effective coordination and control for
the physical flow, organizational flow, information flow and value flow, promote the realization
of preservation and appreciation for the whole industry chain, meet the demand of production
and consumption of FLF (Lu, Wu, Li & Chen, 2014). The framework model of modern supply
chain of FLF is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Modern supply chain of freshwater live fish (FLF)
Compared with the traditional FLF supply chain, the modern supply chain of FLF should have
modern  features  in  the  management  philosophy,  management  style,  organizational
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mechanism, technology, equipment and facilities etc., and this is the indispensable theme for
supply and distribution modernization of  FLF to achieve ecological environment by using the
modern technology of energy conservation and emission reduction (ECER). ECER goal is to
save energy consumption and reduce environmental hazards (including gas, waste water and
noise etc.) emissions, and make use of resources in environmentally friendly way to organically
combine economic development and environmental protection (Wang, 2012).
The overall characteristics of China’s FLF supply chain are high energy consumption (Wang &
Wang,  2008;  Zhu,  Peng  &  Wang,  2010),  low  efficiency  (Zhu  &  Chen,  2006) and  weak
statistical basis (Jing & Wang, 2009), which is still in the extensive development. Liu (2012)
finds that the  organization subjects of FLF supply chain have weak consciousness of ECER
and are  unwilling to adopt new technology of ECER in China.  Since the cause-and-effect
relationship of the investment cost and gains for ECER is undetermined, enterprises with low
ability would be lack of motivation to conduct ECER work. Facing the risk of increased cost
when involved in ECER and meanwhile declining proficiency of skilled workers, rational choice
of general enterprises is the negative response to cope with ECER work (Liu, 2012). Lu et al.
(2014) points out that the basic and applied research of ECER technology in China is not
enough, and core technology on ECER is underdeveloped. The research and development of
product and process technology for ECER is lag behind, and the R&D and promotion service
systems of ECER is not perfect (Lu et al., 2014). There is lack of effective means for Chinese
government to promote ECER and policy support is insufficient. China has not set up special
organizations responsible for advancing the ECER work in this domain, let alone to do a good
job in logistics statistical work of ECER. The implementation of ECER policy mainly relies on
command - control administrative means (Qu, Shi & Hua, 2012). ECER has characteristics of
externalities  and  public  welfare,  which  easily  leads  to  relevant  subjects’  lack  of
implementation motivation (Zhao, 2011). Qu et al. (2012) and Huang (2014) suggest the
government should encourage enterprises to actively participate in, and resolve the inherent
externalities, internalize the externalities through effective measures; internalize the social
benefits formed from ECER into the main economic benefits for operating subjects (Yang,
Wang & Pan, 2014). 
It is no doubt that the behavior incentive policy is important to carry out ECER work for FLF
supply chain. The innovation of the research in this paper is to investigate the subject behavior
of ECER based on structured classification of the organization subject types of FLF supply chain
in China. The contribution to theoretical research is to  distinguish three types of  operating
subjects and organizations of FLF supply chain, and show that the ability and motivation of
operating subjects to participate in ECER work and their effects are significantly different for
different types. Then this research put forward the behavior incentive mechanism of ECER to
support the government to improve the ECER work scientifically, which makes contribution to
the practice community.
-3-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1520
The remainder of this paper is  organized as follows. Section 2  puts forward organizational
behavior analysis on ECER, and classifies the organization subject types of China FLF supply
chain,  characteristics  of  different  supply  chain  organizations  are  compared in  this  section.
Section  3  explores  ECER  behavior  incentive  mechanism modeling  by  taking  advantage  of
principal-agent model in view of asymmetry information, incentives issue of different subjects
of FLF supply chain organization is discussed as enlightenment of the model in this section. The
last section is conclusions.
2. Organizational Behavior Analysis on ECER of FLF Supply Chain
The competition or cooperation game between the government and main body of FLF supply
chain is focus of decision analysis of supply chain organization behavior on ECER. According to
the fluid quality,  FLF is  generally  divided into three categories:  rare  fish,  homely fish and
mid-range fish.  There are significantly  different organization forms for the supply chain of
different FLF, and it results in different behaviors on ECER.
The subject types of FLF supply chain include government management services subject and
investment  operating subject.  The  logistics  industrial chain  of  FLF  has  the  collection  of
investment operations subject affiliated with all upstream and downstream, which constitutes
the supply chain organization of FLF, and it can be roughly divided into three types: loose,
semi-compact and compact organizations.
2.1. Loose Organization
Loose  organization  refers  to  the  organization  connecting  the  upstream  and  downstream
subjects of industrial chain and associated supporting subjects  only with  pure relationship of
market supply and demand of FLF, which generally consists of ordinary farmers, information
brokers, distribution merchants, market dealers, market distributors and retailers and so on.
The  relationship  between  various  types  of  subjects  in  such  supply  chain  is  mainly  the
contractual  relationship,  and once  the transaction  is  completed,  the  contract  between two
parties  will  be  automatically  removed.  Such  supply  chain  organization  is  open,  but  the
behaviors  between  subjects  have  poor  binding  and  high  transaction  risks. Relationship
structure of operating subjects of loose organization is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Subjects relationship of Loose Organization
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2.2. Compact Organization
Compact organization refers to the organization connecting the upstream and downstream
subjects  of  industrial chain and associated supporting subjects  by taking full  advantage of
investment partnership for FLF supply and distribution, which generally controls all functions of
the industrial chain with only one dominant subject, and the dominant subject may be fisheries
operations / scale farms, or logistics operations / companies, or large market distributor /
marketing enterprises and so on. Various subjects in compact organization have unified and
explicit organizational goals, and have established longer-term and fixed subject relationships.
The explicit cooperation agreement negotiated and signed between the subjects has specified
the responsibilities and tasks assumed and rights and gains  shared by related subjects in
advance, and  this agreement has legal force.  Relationship structure of operating subjects of
compact organization is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Subjects relationship of Compact Organization
2.3. Semi-compact Organization
Semi-compact  organization  refers  to  the  organization  connecting  the  upstream  and
downstream subjects of industrial chain and associated supporting subjects  with explicit or
implicit contractual relationships  for  FLF supply and distribution, which generally consists of
large breeders / fishery cooperatives / scale farms, logistics cooperatives / companies, large
market  distributors / marketing  companies,  terminal  retail  companies  and  so  on.  Various
subjects in semi-compact organization often do not sign an essential cooperation agreement,
but  depends  on  credit  accumulation  and  relationship  integration  in  many  years,  namely
psychological contract, forming a tacit, long-term and stable cooperative relations with each
other; new opportunities and profits gained during the transaction will  be shared, and the
additional costs and loss of risk arisen will also be jointly born. Such supply chain organization
not only has emotional trust and commitment, but also has exchange of interests and credit
between  subjects,  which  takes  into  account  the  advantages  of  loose  and  compact
organizations. Relationship  structure  of  operating subjects  of  semi-compact  organization  is
shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Subjects relationship of Semi-compact Organization
2.4. Characteristics Comparison to FLF Supply Chain Organizations
Different types of FLF supply chain organizations have significant characteristics difference in
subjects  relationships,  market  positioning,  distribution technology,  distribution distance,
investment operations, behavioral constraints and ability of subjects, etc., which are shown in
Table 1. 
Factors Loose Organization Semi-compact Organization Compact Organization
Subjects 
Relationship
• approximate a perfectly 
competitive market
• a large number of subjects 
involved
• loose relationship between 
subjects
• without stable contractual 
relationship
• low entry- exit barriers
• approximate a monopolistic 
competitive market
• fewer subjects involved
• close relationship between 
subjects
• a strong psychological 
contractual relationship
• relatively high entry- exit 
barriers
• approximate an 
oligopolistic market
• usually only one subject 
involved
• close relationship between 
subjects
• with strict contractual 
relationship
• high entry- exit barriers
Market 
Positioning
Mainly for average income 
groups, operating low-end FLF
Mainly for middle-income 
groups, operating high-end FLF
Mainly for high income 




Fluid technology grade and 
technical grade of equipment 
and facilities are low.
Fluid technology grade and 
technical grade of equipment 
and facilities are relatively high.
Fluid technology grade and 
technical grade of equipment 
and facilities are high.
Distribution 
Distance
Mainly in small radius and short
distance. 
Mainly in large radius and 
medium or long distance.
Flexibility in distribution 




Fixed investments, fixed costs 
and management costs needed
to be borne are very low, but 
the transaction costs and 
information asymmetries risk 
needed to be borne are high.
Fixed investments, fixed costs 
and management costs needed 
to be borne are relatively high, 
but the transaction costs and 
information asymmetries risk 
needed to be borne are 
relatively low.
Fixed investments, fixed 
costs and management costs 
needed to be borne are high, 
but the transaction costs and 
information asymmetries risk
needed to be borne are low.
Behavioral 
Constraint
• mainly subject to supervision
of government and market
• the abilities of risk control, 
quality assurance and credit 
support are relatively low. 
• subject to supervision of 
government and market and 
also has strong industry self-
discipline
• the abilities of risk control, 
quality assurance and credit 
support are relatively high.
• subject to supervision of 
government and market 
and also has strong self-
discipline
• the abilities of risk control, 
quality assurance and 
credit support are high.
Ability of 
Subjects
Low level in ability and will for 
ECER.
Moderate level in ability and will
for ECER.
High level in ability and will 
for ECER.
Table 1. Characteristics of three types of FLF supply chain organizations
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ECER behavior choice of operating subjects of FLF supply chain can be roughly classified into
three categories:  advanced ECER technology and equipment innovation, intermediate ECER
technology and equipment adoption, and primary ECER technology and equipment application.
Different  types  of  operating subjects can  be  distinguished  by  striking  difference  of  their
behavior choices on ECER.
Premise for operating subjects of FLF supply chain organization to implement ECER strategy is
that  its  benefits  is  greater  than  the  relevant  costs,  whose  behavioral  motivations  include:
respond to the situation of rising energy prices and reduce the operating costs of enterprise
production, reduce the tax credits related to the environment protection paid to the government,
while increasing economic improvement, enhance the good social image in the public, etc.
Operating subjects of compact organization  are relatively consistent with  their targets while
they conduct the ECER work, which can be more consciously to practice the ECER, and can
coordinate the government to establish a win-win symbiotic mechanism on ECER.
Operating subjects of  loose organization  are lack of enthusiasm for  the initiative  to adopt
technologies of ECER, which generally only passively accepts the minimum standards of ECER,
and the primary issue they face is ability-building.
Operating subjects of semi-compact organization have two possible behavioral choices: either
strive to adopt technologies of ECER and follow the high standards to obtain higher income; or
do not work hard to carry out ECER, and then  their behavior is similar to that of operating
subjects of loose organization.
3. ECER Behavior Incentive Mechanism Modeling of FLF Supply Chain
The main game factors for theme scene of ECER on the FLF supply chain are: the upgrading of
equipment  and  facilities  (including  upgrading  of  distribution vehicles,  etc.),  the  degree  of
organization and specialization of operating subjects and so on. The game analysis to theme
scene of ECER on FLF supply chain is to analyze the possible conflicts of subjects’ interest and
policies or solutions based on the above-mentioned variable factors.
3.1. Model Hypothesis and Variable Settings
Denote  δ is  the  marginal  cost  to  implement  ECER  technologies,  also  it  can  be  set  to
characterize the type of operating subjects, and it is the function of organizational degree: α. 
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Assume the operating subject of compact organization has high ability to conduct ECER work,
its organizational degree is denoted as αH, and δH is the marginal cost to conduct ECER work
which denote δH ≡ δ(αH), where .
Assume the operating subject of semi-compact organization has intermediate ability to conduct
ECER work, its  organizational  degree is denoted as  αM,  and  δM is  the marginal  cost which
denote δM ≡ δ(αM), where .
Assume the operating subject of loose organization has primary ability to conduct elementary
work on ECER, its organizational degree is denoted as  αL, and  δL is the marginal cost which
denote δL ≡ δ(αL), where .
Assume the following relationships are satisfied:
αH > αM > αL, δH < δM < δL.
Assume that the government is  in the monopoly position at the ECER market, and act as
principal; operating subjects of FLF supply chain organization who act as agent is the essential
factor for ECER production, their reserved utility is zero. 
Set q denotes the investment level of operating subjects on ECER work, and R(q) indicates the
benefit function of operating subjects on ECER work, taking into account the economic benefit,
social benefit and environmental benefit, where satisfy:
R'(·) > 0, R''(·) < 0, R(0) = 0.
The difference of three types of operating subjects of FLF supply chain organization is reflected
by the investment cost (private information) which characterizes the operating subject types
on ECER work. 
Set  CH denotes the production cost of operating subject of compact organization with high
ability, where CH = δH × q.
Set  CM denotes the production cost of operating subject of semi-compact organization with
intermediate ability, where CM = δM × q.
Set CL denotes the production cost of operating subject of loose organization only with primary
ability, where CL = δL × q.
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The government principal could not make a distinction for the organization type of operating
subject due to the private information, but the distribution of ability structure of operating
subjects is common knowledge. Set pH denotes the proportion of operating subjects with high
ability on ECER work, pM denotes the proportion of operating subjects with intermediate ability
on ECER work, and pL denotes the proportion of operating subjects only with primary ability on
ECER work, where satisfy pL + pM + pH = 1.
Assume that the investment level of operating subject of compact organization with advanced
ECER technology is qH, and receives the subsidy, bH, from government. The investment level of
operating subject of semi-compact organization with intermediate ECER technology is qM, and
receives the subsidy, bM, from government. The investment level of operating subject of loose
organization  only  with  primary  ECER  technology  is  qL,  and  receives  the  subsidy,  bL,  from
government.
Utility functions of operating subjects of FLF supply chain are shown in Equations (1-3):
UH = bH – δH × q, (1)
UM = bM – δM × q, (2)
UL = bL – δL × q. (3)
For the government principal, the question is how to make an incentive mechanism to drive
those  operating  subjects  of  FLF  supply  chain  to  be  actively  involved  in  the  ECER.  More
specifically, the question is how to set standard for the investment level of operating subjects
of FLF supply chain on ECER, and the corresponding subsidy or reward.
3.2. Ideal Situation of Complete Information
When government principal be fully aware of the investment cost type of all operating subjects
of FLF supply chain, as a rational principal in the monopoly position, she/he would pay the
subsidy/reward as low as possible, thus the operating subject only gains the reserved utility
(zero utility), holds:
bH = δH × qH, bM = δM × qM, bL = δL × qL.
Set  πH denotes  the  net  utility  government  received  from  operating  subjects  of  compact
organization with advanced ECER technology,  πM denotes the net utility government received
from operating subjects of semi-compact organization with intermediate ECER technology, and
set πL denotes the net utility government received from operating subjects of loose organization
only with primary ECER technology. They are expressed as the following Equations (4-6):
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πH = R(qH) – δH × qH, (4)
πM = R(qM) – δM × qM, (5)
πL = R(qL) – δL × qL. (6)
The first-order conditions of utility profit maximization are shown as Equations (7-9):
R'( ) = δH, (7)
R'( ) – δM, (8)
R'( ) – δL. (9)
, , and  are uniquely identified by Equations (7-9). For the operating subject of compact
organization with advanced ECER technology, the investment level on ECER which required by
government  is  ,  and receives the subsidy/reward,  δH ×  ;  For  the operating subject  of
semi-compact organization with intermediate ECER technology, the investment level on ECER
which  required  by  government  is  ,  and  receives  the  subsidy/reward,  δM ×  ;  For  the
operating subject of loose organization only with primary ECER technology, the investment
level on ECER which required by government is , and receives the subsidy/reward, δL × .
Due to R''(·) < 0, and 0 < δH < δM < δL, it has  >  > . From Equations (7-9), it gets >  > ,
where = δH × ,  = δM × ,  = δL × . It shows that operating subjects with higher ability
will be required to invest more on ECER, and accordingly get more return for their endeavor. It
reveals the thought that ‘Able men are always busy’.
3.3. Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric Information
In order to improve the effect and efficiency of ECER policy implementation, it is necessary and
appropriate to distinguish operating subject types of FLF supply chain. Under the situation of
asymmetric information, government cannot distinguish operating subject types, or the cost of
classification is so high that it is unpractical or not executable in fact. What the government
could  do  is  to  formulate  different  subsidy/reward  policy  for  different  investment  level  of
operating subjects  on ECER work,  and let  operating subjects  choose the investment  level
independently according to their ability. The key is to design a reasonable policy mechanism.
Set  the  requirement  of  the  subsidy/reward  policy  contract  is:  If  the  investment  level  of
operating subject is more than the value of qH, then the subsidy/reward is bH; otherwise if the
investment level of operating subject is more than the value of qM, then the subsidy/reward is
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bM; otherwise if the investment level of operating subject is more than the value of qL, then the
subsidy/reward is bL.
The incentive compatible constraints of operating subject of FLF supply chain are shown in
Equations (10-12):
bH – δH × qH ≥ bM – δH × qM, (10)
bM – δM × qM ≥ bL – δM × qL, (11)
bL – δL × qL ≥ bM – δL × qM. (12)
And  the  participation  constraints  of  operating  subject  of  FLF  supply  chain  are  shown  in
Equations (13-15):
bH – δH × qH ≥ 0, (13)
bM – δM × qM ≥ 0, (14)
bL – δL × qL ≥ 0. (15)
According to the hypothesis of this model, generally it has  qH ≥ qM ≥ qL ≥ 0. Without loss of
generality, here we only consider the situation of separating equilibrium that qH > qM > qL > 0.
A  reasonable  and  optimized  policy  is  to  stimulate  operating  subjects  of  FLF  supply  chain
exactly, and meanwhile the standard of subsidy/reward is set as low as possible. Thus, at least
one of inequality Equation (10) and Equation (13) is tight (be equality); one of inequality
Equation (11) and Equation (14) is tight; one of inequality Equation (12) and Equation (15) is
tight.
From Equation (11) and Equation (15), as δM < δL, yields
bM – δM × qM ≥ bL – δM × qL > bL – δL × qL ≥ 0.
From the above equation and Equation (10), as δH < δM, yields
bH – δH × qH ≥ bM – δH × qM > bM – δM × qM > 0.
It shows that Equation (13) and Equation (14) are not tight, so Equation (10) and Equation
(11) can be separately expressed as Equation (16) and Equation (17):
bH – δH × qH = bM – δH × qM, (16)
bM – δM × qM ≥ bL – δM × qL. (17)
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At this time, the incentive compatible constraints for operating subjects of semi-compact and
compact organization are working, i.e. the policy of government should encourage operating
subjects of semi-compact and compact organization always to tell the truth (Telling lies means
the situation that the operating subject with high ability pretends to be the subject with low
ability).
When Equation (17) holds, as δM < δL, it shows that Equation (12) is not tight, thus Equation
(15) must be equality Equation (18):
bL – δL × qL = 0. (18)
Denote ΔHM ≡ δM – δH > 0, ΔML ≡ δL – δM > 0, refer to Equation (16-18), yields:
bL = δL × qL, (19)
bM = δM × qM+ ΔML × qL, (20)
bH = δH × qH+ ΔHM × qM + ΔML × qL. (21)
The utility function of government to promote ECER can be expressed as follows:
π(qH, qM, qL) = pL[R(qL) – δL × qL] + pM[R(qM) – (δM × qM + ΔML × qL)] 
+ pH[R(qH) – (δH × qH + ΔHM × qM + ΔML × qL)].
(22)
The first-order conditions of utility profit maximization are shown as Equations (23-25):
R'( ) = δH, (23)
R'( ) – δM +  × ΔHM, (24)
R'( ) – δL +  × ΔML. (25)
Where , ,  are solutions satisfying the above Equations (23-25).
From Equations (7-9) and Equations (23-25), it gets
R'( ) = R'( ), R'( ) > R'( ), R'( ) > R'( );
Thus it has:
 = ,  < ,  < .
Compared with  complete  information situation,  the  required investment  level  on ECER for
operating subjects of compact organization with advanced ECER technology under the situation
of  asymmetric  information remain unchanged  (  =  ).  However,  the required investment
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levels on ECER for operating subjects of semi-compact organization and loose organization
under  the situation of asymmetric  information are reduced,  less  than their  Pareto optimal
levels (  and ). 
In the ideal situation of complete information, subsidies/rewards that operating subjects of FLF
supply chain received from government satisfy >  > . Under the situation of asymmetric
information,  the  reasonable  and  optimized  subsidies/rewards  that  government  pays  to
operating subjects are shown as follows:
 = δH ×  + ΔHM ×  + ΔML × ,
 = δM ×  + ΔML × ,
 = δL × ;
Satisfy  >  > ,  > ,  < .
It tells that government should implement policy for differentiated subsidies / rewards, and
widen the gap of differentiated subsidies / rewards for different types of operating subjects, in
order  to  fully  motivate  the  operating  subjects  of  FLF  supply  chain  under  asymmetric
information. For government principal, the information-rent to motivate operating subjects of
compact  organization  with  advanced  ECER  technology  is  ΔbH =  ΔHM ×  qM +  ΔML ×  qL;  the
information-rent  to  motivate  operating  subjects  of  semi-compact  organization  with
intermediate ECER technology is ΔbM = ΔML × qL.
3.4. Discussions
Public  welfare  characteristics  and externalities  of  ECER  determine  this  work  is  policy
dependent. Operating  subject  of  semi-compact  organization  is  generally  in  the  statistical
majority, and an important goal of the government's ECER policy should be how to motivate
such operating subjects to strive to carry out ECER work, and to avoid possible problems such
as  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard.  Since  the  objective  existence  of  asymmetry
information, the defect of ECER policies from government may lead to operating subjects of
semi-compact organization lack of motivation to strive to do a good job of ECER and just
complete  a  minimum  standard  of  ECER  considering  for  their  own  economic  interests.
Governments need to propose differentiation polices of incentive compensation, including tax
preferential  policy  and  subsidies  incentives  policy,  based on the  classification  of  operating
subjects of FLF supply chain.
The basic principles of government policy on ECER should, based on the sufficient subsidy
incentive  meeting  the  basic  environmental  constraints,  compensate  for  market  failure  by
rational use of subsidies, optimize the allocation of resources and promote the smooth and
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effective development on ECER of FLF  supply chain. Differentiated subsidies / rewards policy
should be formulated for different investment level on ECER, widen the gap of differentiated
subsidies / rewards for different types of operating subjects and let operating subjects choose
the investment level independently according to their ability.
Since the major structure of operating subjects of FLF supply chain will evolve over time, the
ECER behavior  incentive  policy based on the classification of  operating subjects  should be
improved constantly with dynamic adjustment. Government’s ECER work cannot accomplish in
only  one  action,  it  needs  to  be  advanced  in  stages,  and  each  stage  should  be  matched
appropriate  detailed  rules  for  ECER  policy  in  according  to  the  current  major  structure  of
operating subjects of FLF supply chain.
4. Conclusions
ECER is a systematic project which is government-led, business-oriented and the whole society
participates  in,  covers  a  wide  range  and  is  difficult.  Features  of  ECER  determine  the
entities-related to carry out division of labor and assume their duties. The government is in the
dominant position, which should play the role of public service; the operating subject is in the
subject position, which should play the dynamic role. 
Operating subjects of  FLF  supply  chain can  be  roughly  divided  into  three  types:  loose
organization, semi-compact organization and compact organization. The ability and motivation
of operating subjects to participate in ECER work and their effects are significantly different for
different types. Operating subjects of compact organization have the ability to carry out ECER
work, and their management goal is relatively consistent with that of ECER work, thus they
have  power  to  perform  government’s  ECER  policy  requirements.  Operating  subjects  of
semi-compact organization have ability to carry out ECER work, but their management goal is
not  relatively  consistent  with  that  of  ECER  work,  therefore  such  subjects  are  often
underpowered for ECER work and the effect of ECER is policy sensitive. Operating subjects of
loose organization are lack of ability and often need to pay a considerable cost to carry out
ECER  work,  their  management  goal  is  frequently  fall  in  conflict  with  that  of  ECER  work,
therefore such subjects are serious shortage of power to carry out ECER work and the effect of
ECER is difficult to guarantee.
Government  should  introduce  some  timely  policy  and  incentives  on  ECER  based  on  the
classification  of  operating  subjects  of  FLF  supply  chain,  widen  the  gap  of  differentiated
subsidies / rewards for different investment levels on ECER conducted by different operating
subjects,  and  internalize  the  externalities  through  a  variety  of  measures,  such  as  guide,
motivate and standardize the operating subjects through government subsidies incentives, tax
preference and other economic incentives or regulations.
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Since the major structure of operating subjects of FLF supply chain will evolve over time, and
work target of ECER cannot be achieved without long-term unremitting efforts, the dynamic
issues  and simulation  modeling on behavior  incentive  mechanism of  ECER is  worth  to  be
explored in future research.
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